FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
Looking at “compliance” issues, in September 2005, the Inspector General [IG] said he found the Bureau was generally “compliant” with the Attorney General Guidelines concerning FBI Undercover Operations. Unlike deficiencies found in the Confidential Informant Program, the IG said he thought the unit overseeing FBI Undercover Operations was effective and well managed. The IG attributed the unit’s success to an up-to-date field manual and using computer technology to supervise cases.
Generally speaking, the Attorney General Guidelines make clear when the FBI can initiate investigations, collect intelligence, use confidential informants, conduct FBI undercover operations, and monitor/record consensual conversations. Ironically—not long after the guidelines were established—it was Congress who claimed “victim” status because of FBI inflicted abuses. Speaking with the media, some Congressman said the ABSCAM probe “unjustifiably” targeted members with bribes, and some critics claimed the FBI “trolled” for targets in violation of the Bureau’s new guidelines.
But FBI Director William H. Webster disagreed with critics stating agents had a legitimate reason to pursue the ABSCAM investigation. He said he supported the FBI’s use of the undercover technique, particularly when agents investigated bribery, gambling, and/or narcotics because the crimes had a willing participant—making it more difficult for law enforcement to locate someone willing to testify. Using a Confidential Informant [CI] or a Cooperating Witness [CW], Webster said FBI Undercover Operations allow agents to get inside a criminal enterprise enabling investigators to identify and prosecute an organization’s leaders versus members.
While house members were generally supportive of the FBI’s use of the “undercover” technique, the Select Committee said the tactic created serious risks to property and privacy rights—not to mention civil liberties—leaving some to think the tactic could easily be abused. Accordingly, house members sought controls mandating the FBI address certain risk factors before an operation could be authorized.
Consequently—before initiating FBI Undercover Operations—both the Justice Department and the FBI are now required to address certain risk factors including: 1.] agent safety; 2.] damage to public institutions because of FBI manipulation and/or interference; 3.] injury to a target’s reputation; 4.] “entrapment” or outrageous government conduct; and 5.] damage to 3rd parties caused because of the FBI’s generation/creation of a crime.
Because he has an extensive background conducting FBI Undercover Operations, Mr. WEDICK can be extremely helpful representing any client being prosecuted by the government as a result of a “sting” operation.
[NOTE: Information contained herein was summarized from a September 2005 report issued by the Justice Department’s Inspector General Glenn A. Fine]
